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BYZSHIELD: AN EFFICIENT AND ROBUST SYSTEM FOR DISTRIBUTED
TRAINING
Konstantinos Konstantinidis 1 Aditya Ramamoorthy 1
ABSTRACT
Training of large scale models on distributed clusters is a critical component of the machine learning pipeline.
However, this training can easily be made to fail if some workers behave in an adversarial (Byzantine) fashion
whereby they return arbitrary results to the parameter server (PS). A plethora of existing papers consider a variety
of attack models and propose robust aggregation and/or computational redundancy to alleviate the effects of
these attacks. In this work we consider an omniscient attack model where the adversary has full knowledge about
the gradient computation assignments of the workers and can choose to attack (up to) any q out of n worker
nodes to induce maximal damage. Our redundancy-based method ByzShield leverages the properties of bipartite
expander graphs for the assignment of tasks to workers; this helps to effectively mitigate the effect of the Byzantine
behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate an upper bound on the worst case fraction of corrupted gradients based
on the eigenvalues of our constructions which are based on mutually orthogonal Latin squares and Ramanujan
graphs. Our numerical experiments indicate over a 36% reduction on average in the fraction of corrupted gradients
compared to the state of the art. Likewise, our experiments on training followed by image classification on the
CIFAR-10 dataset show that ByzShield has on average a 20% advantage in accuracy under the most sophisticated
attacks. ByzShield also tolerates a much larger fraction of adversarial nodes compared to prior work.
1 INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of machine learning applications have
necessitated the routine training of large scale ML models
in a variety of domains. Owing to computational and space
constraints this training is typically run on distributed clus-
ters. A common architecture of distributed training consists
of a single central server (parameter server or PS) which
maintains a global copy of the model and several worker ma-
chines. The workers compute gradients of the loss function
with respect to the parameters being optimized. The results
are returned to the PS which aggregates them and updates
the model. A new copy of the model is broadcasted from
the PS to the workers and the above procedure is repeated
until convergence. TensorFlow (Abadi et al., 2016), MXNet
(Chen et al., 2015), CNTK (Seide & Agarwal, 2016) and Py-
Torch (Paszke et al., 2019) are all examples of frameworks
that utilize this architecture.
A major challenge with such setups as they scale is the
fact that the system is vulnerable to adversarial attacks by
the computing nodes (i.e., Byzantine behavior), or by fail-
1Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa
State University, Ames, IA 50011 USA. Correspondence to:
Konstantinos Konstantinidis <kostas@iastate.edu>, Aditya Ra-
mamoorthy <adityar@iastate.edu>.
ures/crashes thereof.1 As a result, the corresponding gra-
dients returned to the PS are potentially unreliable for use
in training and model updates. Achieving robustness in the
face of Byzantine node behavior (which can cause gradient-
based methods to converge slowly or converge to a bad
solution) is of crucial importance and has attracted signifi-
cant attention in the community (Gunawi et al., 2018; Dean
et al., 2012; Kotla et al., 2007).
One class of methods investigates techniques for suitably
aggregating the results from the workers. (Blanchard et al.,
2017) establishes that no linear aggregation method (such
as averaging) can be robust even to a single faulty worker.
Robust aggregation has been proposed as an alternative. Ma-
jority voting, geometric median and squared-distance-based
techniques often coupled with averaging all fall into this
category (Damaskinos et al., 2019; Yin et al., 2019; 2018;
Xie et al., 2018; Blanchard et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017).
The benefit of such approaches is the robustness guarantees
they provide. However, they have serious weaknesses. First,
they are very limited in terms of the fraction of Byzantine
nodes they can withstand. Moreover, their complexity often
scales quadratically with the number of workers (Xie et al.,
2018). Finally, their theoretical guarantees are insufficient
to establish convergence and require strict assumptions such
as convexity of the loss function.
1In this work, we assume that the PS is reliable.
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Another category of defenses is based on redundancy and
seeks resilience to Byzantine workers by replicating the gra-
dient computation tasks such that each of them is computed
by more than one machine (Rajput et al., 2019; Chen et al.,
2018; Data et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2018). Even though this
approach fundamentally requires more computation load, it
comes with stronger guarantees of correcting the erroneous
gradients. Existing techniques are sometimes combined
with robust aggregation (Rajput et al., 2019). The main
drawback of recent work in this category is that the model
training can be easily disrupted by a powerful omniscient
adversary who has full control of a subset of the nodes and
can mount judicious attacks.
1.1 Contributions
In this work, we propose our redundancy-based method
ByzShield that provides robustness in the face of a signif-
icantly stronger attack model than has been considered in
prior work. In particular, we consider an omniscient ad-
versary who has full knowledge of the tasks assigned to
the workers. The adversary is allowed to pick any subset
of q worker nodes to attack at each iteration of the algo-
rithm. Our model allows for collusion among the Byzantine
workers to inflict maximum damage on the training process.
Our work demonstrates an interesting link between achiev-
ing robustness and spectral graph theory. Specifically,
we demonstrate that using optimal expander graphs (con-
structed from mutually orthogonal Latin squares and Ra-
manujan graphs) allows us to assign redundant tasks to
workers in such a way that the adversary’s ability to corrupt
the gradients is significantly reduced as compared to the
prior state of the art.
Our theoretical analysis shows that our method achieves
a much lower fraction of corrupted gradients compared to
other methods (Rajput et al., 2019); this is supported by nu-
merical simulations which indicate over a 36% reduction on
average in the fraction of corrupted gradients. Our experi-
mental results on large scale training for image classification
(CIFAR-10) shows that ByzShield has on average a 20%
advantage in accuracy under the most sophisticated attacks.
Finally, we demonstrate the fragility of existing schemes
(Rajput et al., 2019) to simple attacks under our considered
attack model when the number of Byzantine workers is large.
In these cases, prior state-of-the-art methods either diverge
or are not applicable (Damaskinos et al., 2019; Rajput et al.,
2019; El Mhamdi et al., 2018), whereas ByzShield can
converge to accurate models.
1.2 Related Work
Prior work in this area considers adversaries with a wide
range of powers. For instance, DETOX and DRACO con-
sider adversaries that are only able to attack a random set of
workers. In our case, an adversary possesses full knowledge
of the task assignment and attacked workers can collude.
Prior work which considers the same adversarial model as
ours includes (Baruch et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2018; Yin
et al., 2018; El Mhamdi et al., 2018; Shen et al., 2016) .
One of the most popular robust aggregation techniques is
known as mean-around-median or trimmed mean (Xie et al.,
2018; Yin et al., 2018; El Mhamdi et al., 2018). It handles
each dimension of the gradient separately and returns the
average of a subset of the values that are closest to the me-
dian. Auror introduced in (Shen et al., 2016) is a variant of
trimmed median which partitions the values of each dimen-
sion into two clusters using k-means and discards the smaller
cluster if the distance between the two exceeds a threshold;
the values of the larger cluster are then averaged. signSGD
in (Bernstein et al., 2019) transmits only the sign of the
gradient vectors from the workers to the PS and exploits
majority voting to decide the overall update; this practice
improves communication time and denies any individual
worker too much effect on the update.
Krum in (Blanchard et al., 2017) chooses a single honest
worker for the next model update. The chosen gradient is
the one closest to its k ∈ N nearest neighbors. The authors
recognized in later work (El Mhamdi et al., 2018) that Krum
may converge to an ineffectual model in the landscape of
non-convex high dimensional problems. They showed that a
large adversarial change to a single parameter with a minor
impact on the Lp norm can make the model ineffective.
They present an alternative defense called Bulyan to oppose
such attacks. Nevertheless, if K machines are used, Bulyan
is designed to defend only up to (K − 3)/4 fraction of
corrupted workers. Similarly, the method of (Chen et al.,
2017) is based on the geometric median of means.
In the area of redundancy-based methods, DRACO in (Chen
et al., 2018) uses a simple Fractional Repetition Code (FRC)
(that operates by grouping workers) and the cyclic repetition
code introduced in (Raviv et al., 2018; Tandon et al., 2017)
to ensure robustness; majority vote and Fourier decoders
try to alleviate the adversarial effects. That work ensures
exact recovery (as if the system had no adversaries) with q
Byzantine nodes and each task needs to be replicated r ≥
2q + 1 times; the bound is information-theoretic minimum
and DRACO is not applicable if it is violated. Nonetheless,
this requirement is very restrictive for the typical assumption
that up to half of the workers can be Byzantine.
DETOX in (Rajput et al., 2019) extends the work of (Chen
et al., 2018) and uses a simple grouping strategy to assign
the gradients. It performs multiple stages of aggregation
to gradually filter the adversarial values. The first stage
involves majority voting while the following stages perform
robust aggregation, as discussed before. Unlike DRACO,
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the authors do not seek exact recovery hence the minimum
requirement in r is small. However, the theoretical resilience
guarantees that DETOX provides depend heavily on a “ran-
dom assignment” of tasks to workers and on “random choice”
of the adversarial workers. Furthermore, their theoretical re-
sults hold when the fraction of Byzantines is less than 1/40.
Under these assumptions, they show that on average a small
percentage of the gradient computations will be distorted.
2 PARALLEL TRAINING FORMULATION
The formulation we discuss is standard in distributed deep
learning. Assume that the loss function of the i-th sample is
li(w), where w ∈ Rd is the parameter set of the model. We
seek to minimize the empirical risk of the dataset, i.e.,
min
w
L(w) = min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
li(w)
where n is the size of the dataset. This is typically solved it-
eratively via mini-batch Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
over distributed clusters. Initially, the parameters w are
randomly set to w0 (in general, we will denote the state of
the model at the end of iteration t with wt). Following this,
a randomly chosen batch Bt of b samples is used to perform
the update in the t-th iteration. Thus,
wt+1 = wt − ηt
1
|Bt|
∑
i∈Bt
∇li(wt) (1)
where ηt denotes the learning rate of the t-th iteration. In
this work, we focus on synchronous SGD in which the PS
waits for all workers to return before performing an update.
Within the cluster of K + 1 servers the PS updates the
global model after receiving the computations from the K
workers. It also stores the dataset and the model and coordi-
nates the training protocol. The remaining servers, denoted
U0, . . . , UK−1, will be the workers computing gradients on
subsets of the batch.
Worker Assignment: A given batch Bt is split into f dis-
joint sets (or files) denoted Bt,i, for i = 0, . . . , f −1. These
files are then assigned to the workers according to a bipartite
graph G = (U ∪ Ft, E), where U = {U0, U1 . . . , UK−1}
and Ft = {Bt,i : i = 0, 1, . . . , f − 1} denote the workers
and the files respectively. An edge exists between u ∈ U
and v ∈ Ft if worker u is assigned file v. In general, a given
file is assigned to r > 1 workers (r is called the replication
factor); this allows for protection against Byzantine behav-
ior. It follows that each worker is responsible for l = fr/K
files; l is called the computational load of the system. We
let N (S) denote the set of neighbors of a subset S of the
nodes. Thus, N (Uj) denotes the set of files assigned to
worker Uj and N (Bt,i) denotes the set of workers that are
assigned file Bt,i.
. . .
Aggregation
Figure 1: Aggregation of gradients on a training cluster.
Byzantine Attack Model: We consider a model where q
workers operate in a Byzantine fashion, i.e., they can return
arbitrary values to the PS. Our attack setup is omniscient
where a worker, Byzantine or honest, knows the data assign-
ment of all other participants and the model at every itera-
tion; the choice of the Byzantine workers can also change
across iterations. Furthermore, the Byzantine machines can
collude to induce maximal damage. We will suppose that
the fraction of Byzantine workers ε = q/K is less than 1/2.
We emphasize that this is a stronger adversary model than
those considered in other redundancy-based work (Rajput
et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018). Let ĝ(j)t,i be the value re-
turned from the j-th worker to the PS for assigned file Bt,i.
Then,
ĝ
(j)
t,i =
{
gt,i if Uj is honest,
x otherwise (2)
where gt,i is the sum of the loss gradients on all samples in
file Bt,i, i.e.,
gt,i =
∑
j∈Bt,i
∇lj(wt)
and x is any arbitrary vector in Rd.
Training Protocol: The training protocol followed in our
work is similar to the one introduced in (Rajput et al., 2019).
Following the assignment of files, each worker Uj computes
the gradients of the samples in N (Uj) and sends them to
the PS. Subsequently, the PS will perform a majority vote
across the computations of each file. Recall that each file
has been processed by r workers. For each such file Bt,i,
the PS decides a majority value mi
mi
def
= majority
{
ĝ
(j)
t,i : Uj ∈ N (Bt,i)
}
. (3)
In our implementation, the majority function picks out the
gradient that appears the maximum number of times. We
ensure that there are no floating point precision issues with
this method, i.e., all honest workers assigned to Bt,i will
return the exact same gradient. However, potential precision
issues can easily be handled by deciding the majority by
defining appropriate clusters amongst the returned gradients.
Assume that r is odd (needed in order to avoid breaking
ties) and let r′ = r+12 . Under the majority rule in Eq.
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(3), the gradient on a file is distorted only if at least r′
of the computations are performed by Byzantine workers.
Following the majority vote, the gradients go through an
aggregation step. One demonstration of this procedure is
in Figure 1. There are K = 6 machines and f = 4 distinct
files (represented by colored circles) replicated r = 3 times.
Each of the workers is assigned to two files and computes
the sum of gradients (or an adversarial vector) on each file.
At the next step, all returned values for the red file will
be evaluated by a majority vote function (“m” ellipses)
on the PS which decides a single output value; a similar
voting is done for the other 3 files. After the majority voting
process, the “winning” gradients mi, i = 0, 1, . . . , f − 1
can be further filtered by some aggregation function; in
ByzShield we chose to apply coordinate-wise median. The
entire procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
Figures of Merit: Firstly, we consider (i) the fraction of
the estimated gradients mi which are potentially erroneous.
However, the end goal is to understand how the presence of
Byzantine workers affects the overall training of the model
under the different schemes. Towards this end, we will also
measure the (ii) accuracy of the trained model on classifica-
tion tasks. Finally, robustness to adversaries comes at the
cost of increased training time. Thus, our third metric is (iii)
overall time taken to fit the model. Asymptotic complexity
(iv) is briefly addressed in the Appendix Section A.1.
3 EXPANSION PROPERTIES OF BIPARTITE
GRAPHS AND BYZANTINE RESILIENCE
The central idea of our work is that concepts from spectral
graph theory (Chung, 1997) can guide us in the design of the
bipartite graph G that specifies the worker-file assignment.
In particular, we demonstrate that the second eigenvalue of
the bi-adjacency matrix of G is closely related to the under-
lying expansion of the graph and can in turn be related to
the scheme’s robustness under the omniscient attack model.
A graph with good expansion is one where any small enough
set of nodes is guaranteed to have a large number of neigh-
bors. This implies that the Byzantine nodes together process
a large number of files which in turn means that their ability
to corrupt the majority on many of them is limited.
For a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) with |V1| =
K, |V2| = f , its bi-adjacency matrix H is defined as
Hi,j =
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ E,
0 otherwise. (4)
We only consider biregular G where the left and right de-
grees of all nodes are the same; these are denoted dL and
dR respectively. Let A = 1√dLdRH denote the normalized
bi-adjacency matrix. It is known that the eigenvalues of
AAT (or ATA) are 1 = µ0 > µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µK−1 ≥ µK =
Algorithm 1: Majority-based algorithm to alleviate
Byzantine effects.
Input: Data set of n samples, batch size b,
computation load l, redundancy r,
number of files f , maximum iterations T ,
assignment graph G.
1 The PS randomly initializes model’s parameters to w0.
2 for t = 1 to T do
3 PS chooses batch Bt ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} of b samples,
partitions it into files and assigns them to workers
based on graph G. It then transmits model wt to
all workers.
4 for each worker Uj do
5 if Uj is honest then
6 for each file i ∈ N (Uj) do
7 Uj computes the sum of gradients
ĝ
(j)
t,i =
∑
k∈Bt,i
∇lk(wt).
8 end
9 else
10 Uj constructs adversarial vectors
ĝ
(j)
t,i1
, ĝ
(j)
t,i2
, . . . , ĝ
(j)
t,il
.
11 end
12 Uj returns ĝ
(j)
t,i1
, ĝ
(j)
t,i2
, . . . , ĝ
(j)
t,il
to the PS.
13 end
14 for i = 0 to f − 1 do
15 PS determines the r workers in N (Bt,i) which
have processed Bt,i and computes
mi = majority
{
ĝ
(j)
t,i : j ∈ N (Bt,i)}
}
.
16 end
17 PS updates the model via
wt+1 = wt − ηt
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
mi.
18 end
· · · = µf−1 = 0 if K < f (Chung, 1997).
For a subset of the vertices S, let vol(S) denote the number
of edges that connect a vertex in S with another vertex not in
S. We will use the following lemma (Zhu & Chugg, 2007).
Lemma 1. For any bipartite graph G = (U ∪ F , E) and a
subset S of U (or F)
vol(N (S))
vol(S)
≥ 1
µ1 + (1− µ1)vol(S)|E|
.
Now suppose that the bipartite graph G chosen for the
worker-file assignment has a second-eigenvalue = µ1. Based
on Lemma 1, if S is a set of q Byzantine workers, then
vol(S) = ql since G is bipartite. By substitution, we com-
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Table 1: A set of three MOLS of degree 5.
0 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 0
2 3 4 0 1
3 4 0 1 2
4 0 1 2 3
L1
0 1 2 3 4
2 3 4 0 1
4 0 1 2 3
1 2 3 4 0
3 4 0 1 2
L2
0 1 2 3 4
3 4 0 1 2
1 2 3 4 0
4 0 1 2 3
2 3 4 0 1
L3
pute that the number of files collectively being processed by
the workers in S is lower bounded as follows.
|N (S)| ≥ ql/r
µ1 + (1− µ1) qK
def
= β. (5)
Claim 1. Let c(q)max be the maximum number of files one can
distort with q Byzantines (since there is a bijection between
gradients and files distorting a file is equivalent to distorting
the gradient of the samples it contains hence the two terms
will be used interchangeably). Then,
c(q)max ≤
l|S| − β
r′ − 1
=
ql − β
(r − 1)/2
def
= γ.
The proof is in the Appendix.
4 TASK ASSIGNMENT
In this Section, we propose two different techniques of con-
structing the graph G which determines the allocation of
gradient tasks to workers in ByzShield. Our graphs have
|U| ≤ |F| (i.e., fewer workers than files) and possess opti-
mal expansion properties in terms of their spectrum.
4.1 Task Assignment Based on Latin Squares
We extensively use combinatorial structures known as Latin
squares (Van Lint & Wilson, 2001) (in short, LS) in this pro-
tocol. The basic definitions and known results about them
that we will need in our exposition are presented below.
4.1.1 Basic Definitions and Properties
We begin with the definition of a Latin square.
Definition 1. A Latin square of degree l is a quadruple
(R,C, S;L) where R,C and S are sets with l elements
each and L is a mapping L : R × C → S such that for
any i ∈ R and x ∈ S, there is a unique j ∈ C such that
L(i, j) = x. Also, any two of i ∈ R, j ∈ C and x ∈ S
uniquely determine the third so that L(i, j) = x.
We refer to the sets R, C and S as rows, columns and
symbols of the Latin square, respectively. The representation
of a LS is an l× l array L in which the cell Lij contains the
symbol L(i, j).
Algorithm 2: Proposed MOLS-based assignment.
Input: Batch size b, computation load l, redundancy
r ≤ l − 1, empty graph G with worker vertices
U and file vertices Ft.
1 The PS partitions Bt into l2 disjoint files of b/l2
samples each
Bt =
{
Bt,i : i = 0, 1, . . . , l
2 − 1
}
= Ft.
2 The PS constructs a set of r MOLS L1, L2, . . . , Lr of
degree l with symbols S = {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}.
3 for k = 0 to r − 1 do
4 for s = 0 to l − 1 do
5 PS identifies all cells (i, j) with symbol s in
Lk+1 and connects vertex (file) Bt,il+j to
vertex (worker) Ukl+s in G.
6 end
7 end
Definition 2. Two Latin squares L1 : R×C → S and L2 :
R× C → S (with the same row and column sets) are said
to be orthogonal when for each ordered pair (s, t) ∈ S × T ,
there is a unique cell (i, j) ∈ R× C so that
L1(i, j) = s and L2(i, j) = t.
A set of k Latin squares of degree l which are pairwise
orthogonal are called mutually orthogonal or MOLS. It can
be shown (Van Lint & Wilson, 2001) that the maximal size
of an orthogonal set of Latin squares of degree l is l − 1.
We use a standard construction which yields l− 1 MOLS of
degree l. Initially, pick a prime power l. (i) All row, column
and symbol sets are to be the elements of Fl (the finite field
of size l), i.e., R = C = S = Fl = {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}. (ii)
Then, for each nonzero element α in Fl, define Lα(i, j) :=
αi + j (addition is over Fl). The l − 1 squares created in
this manner are MOLS since linear equations of the form
ai+bj = s, ci+dj = t have unique solutions (i, j) provided
that ad− bc 6= 0 which is the case here.
Table 1 shows an example of the above procedure that yields
four MOLS of degree 5 (only the first three are shown and
will be used in the sequel) for R = C = S = F5 =
{0, 1, . . . , 4} and Lα(i, j) = αi+ j (mod 5), α = 1, 2, 3.
4.1.2 Redundant Task Allocation
To allocate the batch of an iteration, Bt, to workers,
first, we will partition Bt into f = l2 disjoint files
Bt,0, Bt,2, . . . , Bt,l2−1 of b/l2 samples each where l is the
degree of a set of MOLS constructed as in Sec. 4.1.1. Fol-
lowing this we construct a bipartite graph specifying the
placement according to the MOLS (see Algorithm 2).
The following example showcases the proposed protocol of
Algorithm 2 using the MOLS from Table 1.
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Table 2: File allocation for l = 5, r = 3 based on MOLS.
Node Stores
U0 0, 9, 13, 17, 21
U1 1, 5, 14, 18, 22
U2 2, 6, 10, 19, 23
U3 3, 7, 11, 15, 24
U4 4, 8, 12, 16, 20
2(a) 1st replica.
Node Stores
U5 0, 8, 11, 19, 22
U6 1, 9, 12, 15, 23
U7 2, 5, 13, 16, 24
U8 3, 6, 14, 17, 20
U9 4, 7, 10, 18, 21
2(b) 2nd replica.
Node Stores
U10 0, 7, 14, 16, 23
U11 1, 8, 10, 17, 24
U12 2, 9, 11, 18, 20
U13 3, 5, 12, 19, 21
U14 4, 6, 13, 15, 22
2(c) 3rd replica.
Example 1. Consider K = 15 workers U0, . . . , U14, l = 5
and r = 3. Based on our protocol the l2 = 25 files of each
batch Bt would be arranged on a grid L, as defined above.
Since r = 3, the construction (see line 2 of the algorithm)
involves the use of 3 MOLS of degree l = 5, shown in Table
1. For the LS L1 (k = 0 in step 3 of the algorithm) choose,
e.g., symbol s = 0. The locations of s = 0 in L1 are
(0, 0), (1, 4), (2, 3), (3, 2) and (4, 1) and the files in those
cells in L are Bt,0, Bt,9, Bt,13, Bt,17 and Bt,21. Hence, U0
will receive those files from the PS. The complete file as-
signment for the cluster is shown in Table 2 (the index i of
file Bt,i has been used instead for brevity).
It is evident that each worker stores l files. Another obser-
vation that follows directly from the placement policy (cf.
Algorithm 2) and Definition 1 is that any two workers popu-
lated based on the same Latin square do not share any files
while Definition 2 implies that a pair of workers populated
based on two different orthogonal Latin squares should have
exactly one file in common.
4.2 Task Assignment Based on Direct Graph
Constructions
We next focus on direct construction of bipartite graphs for
the task assignment. In this regard, we consider Ramanujan
bigraphs which provably achieve the smallest possible value
of the second largest eigenvalue of AAT , as defined in
Section 3 (see also (Feng & Li, 1996)).
4.2.1 Redundant Task Allocation
There are many ways to construct a (dL, dR)-biregular bipar-
tite graph with the Ramanujan property (Høholdt & Janwa,
2012). We use the one presented in (Burnwal et al., 2019).
This method yields a (s,m) or an (m, s) biregular graph
(depending on the relation between the integers m, s) for
m ≥ 2 and a prime s. It is based on LDPC “array code”
matrices (Fan, 2001) and proceeds as follows.
• Step 1: Pick integer m ≥ 2 and prime s.
• Step 2: Define a cyclic shift permutation matrix Ps×s
Pij =
{
1 if j ≡ i− 1 (mod s),
0 otherwise
where i = 1, 2, . . . , s and j = 1, 2, . . . , s.
• Step 3: Construct matrix B as
B =

Is Is Is · · · Is
Is P P
2 · · · Pm−1
Is P
2 P 4 · · · P 2(m−1)
Is P
3 P 6 · · · P 3(m−1)
...
...
...
...
...
Is P
s−1 P 2(s−1) · · · P (m−1)(s−1)

.
B is a s2 ×ms matrix constructed as a s ×m block
matrix. If m ≥ s, then H = B is chosen to be the
biadjacency matrix of the bipartite graph, otherwise
H = BT is chosen. In both cases, H represents a
Ramanujan bigraph. Note that H is a zero-one bi-
adjacency matrix since P and hence all of its powers
are permutation matrices.
As mentioned earlier, we will assume K ≤ f . The rows
of H will therefore correspond to workers and the columns
will correspond to files in both of the above cases. Since all
blocks of H are permutation matrices the support of each
row (size of storage of worker) and column (replication of
file) can be easily derived. This yields two cases when this
construction is applied to our setup
(K, f, l, r) =
{
(ms, s2, s,m) if m < s,
(s2,ms,m, s) otherwise. (6)
We will refer to the case m < s as Ramanujan Case 1 and
to the other case as Ramanujan Case 2. We can have setups
with identical parameters between the MOLS formulation
and Case 1; specifically, one can choose the same compu-
tation load l (for prime l) and replication factor r such that
r < l which in both schemes will make use of K = rl
workers and f = l2 files. The need for a prime l makes
the Ramanujan scheme less flexible in terms of choosing
the computation load, though. Ramanujan Case 2 requires
r ≥ l hence we examine this method separately.
5 DISTORTION FRACTION ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform a worst-case analysis of the
fraction of distorted files incurred by various aggregation
methods, including that of ByzShield. This fraction will be
defined as ε̂ = c(q)max/f .
A few reasons motivate this analysis. Principally, our deep
learning experiments (upcoming Section 6.2) show that ε̂
is a very useful indicator of the convergence of a model’s
training. Also, this comparison shows the superiority of
ByzShield in terms of theoretical robustness guarantees
since we achieve a much smaller ε̂ for the same q. Finally,
we demonstrate via numerical experiments that the quantity
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γ is a tight upper bound on the exact value of c(q)max for
ByzShield.
We next compute the spectrum of AAT , as defined in Sec-
tion 3, of our utilized constructions. The authors of (Burn-
wal et al., 2019) [Theorem 6] have computed the set of
singular values of H of Ramanujan Cases 1 and 2. In order
to have a direct comparison between the spectral proper-
ties of the MOLS scheme and these Ramanujan graphs, we
have normalized H and computed the eigenvalues of the
corresponding AAT instead. For the MOLS scheme, the
normalized bi-adjacency matrix A has dL = l and dR = r.
We denote an eigenvalue x with algebraic multiplicity y
with (x, y). All proofs for this Section are in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.
• MOLS and Ramanujan Case 1: (AAT )MOLS and
(AAT )Ram.1 require 2 < r < l and have spectrum
{(1, 1), (1/r, r(l − 1)), (0, r − 1)}.
• Ramanujan Case 2: (AAT )Ram.2 requires r ≤ l, r|l
and has spectrum
{(1, 1), (1/r, r(r − 1)), (0, r − 1)}.
The eigenvalues are sorted in decreasing order of magnitude.
Interestingly, (AAT )Ram.1 has exactly the same spectrum
as if the graph was constructed from a set of MOLS. Overall,
the parameters l, r, number of workers K = rl, number of
files f = l2 and the second largest eigenvalue of AAT ,
µ1 = 1/r, are all identical across the two schemes.
5.1 Upper Bounds of ε̂ByzShield Based on Graph
Expansion
5.1.1 MOLS-based Graphs
Based on Lemma 2, µ1 = 1/r is the second largest eigen-
value of (AAT )MOLS . Substituting in the expression of
Eq. (5), Claim 1 gives us the exact value for γ. It is a tight
upper bound on c(q)max for the MOLS protocol and by nor-
malizing it we conclude that an optimal attack when a set of
q Byzantines is chosen, distorts at most a fraction
ε̂MOLS ≤ γ
f
=
2q2
rl2
1 + (r − 1) qrl
of the files.
5.1.2 Ramanujan Graphs
By Lemma 2, the underlying graph of the MOLS assignment
is a Ramanujan graph and all results of Section 5.1.1 carry
over verbatim to Case 1.
Case 2 needs to be treated separately since it leads to a
different cluster setup with K = s2 = r2 workers and
f = rl files with an underlying graph with µ1 = 1/s = 1/r.
A simple computation yields
ε̂Ram.2 ≤ γ
f
=
2q2
r2
r + (r − 1) qr
.
5.2 Exact Value of ε̂ByzShield in the Regime q ≤ r
When q ≤ r, i.e., in the regime where there are only a
few Byzantine workers, we can provide exact values of ε̂
for our constructions. In particular we pick the q workers
to be Byzantine such that the multiset of the files stored
collectively across them (also referred to as multiset sum)
has the maximal possible number of files repeated at least r′
times. In this way, the majority of the copies of those files is
distorted and the aggregation produces erroneous gradients.
Claim 2. The maximum distortion fraction incurred by an
optimal attack for the regime q ≤ r is characterized as
follows.
• If r = 3, then
ε̂ByzShield =
 0 if q < 2,1/f if q = 2,
3/f if q = 3.
• If r > 3, then
ε̂ByzShield =
 0 if q < r
′,
1/f if r′ ≤ q < r,
2/f if q = r.
5.3 Comparisons With Prior Work
We compare with the values of ε̂ achieved by baseline and
other redundancy-based methods. Baseline approaches do
not involve redundancy or majority voting; their aggregation
is applied directly to theK gradients returned by the workers
and hence f = K and c(q)max = q which yields a distortion
fraction ε̂ = q/K. We also compare the actual values of
c
(q)
max for ByzShield against the theoretical upper bounds
based on the expansion analysis in Section 5.1.
5.3.1 Achievable ε̂ of Prior Work Under Worst-case
Attacks
We now present a direct comparison between our work and
state-of-the-art schemes that are redundancy-based. DETOX
in (Rajput et al., 2019) and DRACO in (Chen et al., 2018)
both use the same Fractional Repetition Code (FRC) for the
assignment and both use majority vote aggregation, hence
we will treat them in a unified manner. Our goal is to es-
tablish that redundancy is not enough to achieve resilience
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Table 3: Distortion fraction evaluation for MOLS-based
assignment for (K, f, l, r) = (15, 25, 5, 3) and comparison.
q c
(q)
max ε̂
ByzShield ε̂Baseline ε̂FRC γ
2 1 0.04 0.13 0.2 2.11
3 3 0.12 0.2 0.2 4.29
4 5 0.2 0.27 0.4 6.96
5 8 0.32 0.33 0.4 10
6 12 0.48 0.4 0.6 13.33
7 14 0.56 0.47 0.6 16.9
to adversaries; rather, a careful task assignment is of major
importance. The basic placement of FRC is splitting the K
workers into K/r groups. Within a group, all workers are
responsible for the same part of a batch of size br/K and
a majority vote aggregation is executed in the group. Their
method fundamentally relies on the fact that the Byzan-
tines are chosen at random for each iteration and hence
the probability of at least r′ Byzantines being in the same
majority-vote group is low on expectation. However, in an
omniscient setup, if an adversary chooses the Byzantines
such that at least r′ workers in each group are adversarial,
then it is evident that all corresponding gradients will be
distorted. Such an attack can distort the votes in b qr′ c groups.
To formulate a direct comparison with ByzShield let us mea-
sure ε̂ in this worst-case scenario. For FRC, this is equal to
the number of affected groups multiplied by the number of
samples per group and normalized by b, i.e.,
ε̂FRC =
b qr′ c × br/K
b
= b q
r′
c × r/K.
We pinpoint that at the regime q ≤ r′ all of the aforemen-
tioned schemes, including ours, achieve perfect recovery
since there are not enough adversaries to distort any file. In
addition, DRACO would fail in the regime q > r′ while
ByzShield still demonstrates strong robustness results.
5.3.2 Numerical Simulations
For ByzShield, we ran exhaustive simulations2, i.e, we com-
puted c(q)max considering all adversarial choices of q out of
K workers. The evaluation of the MOLS-based allocation
scheme of Section 4.1 for Example 1 with (l, r) = (5, 3)
is in Table 3 where for different values of q we report the
simulated c(q)max, the corresponding ε̂ and the upper bound γ.
Since a Ramanujan-based scheme of Case 1 has the same
properties, the upper bounds are expected to be identical
(however the actual task assignment is in general different).
An interesting observation is that the simulations of the ac-
tual value of c(q)max were also identical across the two; thus,
both have been summarized in the same Table 3. More sim-
ulations including Ramanujan Case 2 are shown in Section
2https://github.com/kkonstantinidis/ByzShield
A.5 of the Appendix. From these tables we deduce that γ is
a very accurate worst-case approximation of c(q)max.
Comparing with the achieved ε̂FRC computed as in Section
5.3.1, note that ByzShield can tolerate a higher number of
Byzantines while consistently maintaining a small fraction
ε̂. In contrast, a worst-case attack on FRC raises this error
very quickly with respect to q. On average, ε̂ByzShield =
0.64ε̂FRC in Table 3. Finally, ByzShield has a benefit over
baseline methods for up to q = 5 with respect to ε̂.
6 LARGE-SCALE DEEP LEARNING
EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Experiment Setup
We have evaluated our method in classification tasks on large
datasets on Amazon EC2 clusters. This project is written in
PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2019) and uses the MPICH library
for communication among the devices. The implementation
builds on DETOX3 and has been provided4. The principal
metric used in our evaluation is the top-1 test accuracy.
The classification tasks were performed using CIFAR-10
with ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016). Experimenting with hy-
perparameter tuning we have chosen the values for batch
size, learning rate scheduling, and momentum, among oth-
ers. We used clusters of K = 25 and K = 15 workers of
type c5.4xlarge on Amazon EC2 for various values of
q. The PS was an i3.16xlarge instance in both cases.
More details are in the Appendix.
The cluster ofK = 25 workers utilizes the Ramanujan Case
2 construction presented in Section 4.2.1 with r = l = 5
resulting in partitioning each batch into f = rl = 25 files.
For K = 15, we used the MOLS scheme (cf. Section
4.1) for r = 3 and l = 5 such that f = l2 = 25. The
corresponding simulated values of c(q)max and the fraction of
distorted files, ε̂, under the attack on DETOX proposed in
Section 5.3 are in Tables 4 and 3, respectively.
The attack models we tried are the following
• ALIE (Baruch et al., 2019): This attack involves com-
munication among the Byzantines in which they jointly
estimate the mean µi and standard deviation σi of the
batch’s gradient for each dimension i. They subse-
quently send a function of those moments to the PS
such that it will distort the median of the results.
• Constant: Adversarial workers send a constant matrix
with all elements equal to a fixed value; the matrix has
the same dimensions as the true gradient.
3https://github.com/hwang595/DETOX
4https://github.com/kkonstantinidis/ByzShield
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Figure 2: ALIE attack and
median-based defenses (CIFAR-10).
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Figure 3: ALIE attack and
Bulyan-based defenses (CIFAR-10).
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Figure 4: ALIE attack and
Multi-Krum-based defenses
(CIFAR-10).
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Figure 5: Constant attack and
signSGD-based defenses (CIFAR-10).
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Figure 6: Reversed gradient attack and
median-based defenses (CIFAR-10).
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Figure 7: Reversed gradient attack and
Bulyan-based defenses (CIFAR-10).
• Reversed gradient: Byzantines return −cg for c > 0,
to the PS instead of the true gradient g.
The ALIE algorithm is, to the best of our knowledge, the
most sophisticated attack in literature for centralized setups.
Our experiments showcase this fact. Constant attack often
alters the gradients towards wrong directions in order to
disrupt the model’s convergence and is also a powerful
attack. Reversed gradient is the weakest among the three,
as we will discuss in the Section 6.2.
In all of our experiments, we chose the q Byzantines such
that ε̂ is maximized; this is equivalent to a worst-case omni-
scient adversary which can control all devices.
The defense mechanism ByzShield applied on the outputs
of the majority votes is coordinate-wise median (Yin et al.,
2019) across the f gradients computed as in Algorithm 1
(lines 14-16). We decided to pair our method with median
since in most cases it worked well and we did not have to
resort to more sophisticated baseline defenses.
The most popular baseline techniques we compare against
are median-of-means (Minsker, 2015), coordinate-wise ma-
jority voting with signSGD (Bernstein et al., 2019), Multi-
Krum (Damaskinos et al., 2019) and Bulyan (El Mhamdi
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Figure 8: Reversed gradient attack and Multi-Krum-based
defenses (CIFAR-10).
et al., 2018). The latter two are robust to only a small frac-
tion of erroneous results and their implementations rely on
this assumption. Specifically, if c(q)max is the number of adver-
sarial operands then Multi-Krum requires at least 2c(q)max +3
total number of operands while the same number for Bulyan
is 4c(q)max + 3. These constraints are very restrictive and the
methods are inapplicable for larger values of q for which our
method is Byzantine-robust. DETOX (Rajput et al., 2019)
uses the aforementioned baseline methods for aggregating
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the “winning” gradients after the majority voting.
6.2 Results
In order to effectively interpret the results, the fraction of
distorted gradients ε̂ needs to be taken into account; we will
refer to the values in Appendix Table 4 throughout this expo-
sition. Due to the nature of gradient-descent methods, ε̂ may
not be always proportional to how well a method works but
it is a good starting point. We will restrict our interpretation
of the results to the case of K = 25. For K = 15, we
performed a smaller range of experiments demonstrating
similar effects (cf. Figures 9, 10, 11 in Appendix).
Let us focus on the results under the median-based defenses.
In Figure 2, we compare ByzShield, the baseline imple-
mentation of coordinate-wise median (ε̂ = 0.12, 0.2 for
q = 3, 5, respectively) and DETOX with median-of-means
(ε̂ = 0.2) under the ALIE attack. ByzShield achieves at
least a 20% average accuracy overhead for both values of
q (ε̂ = 0.04, 0.08 for q = 3, 5, respectively). In Figure 6
(reversed gradient), we observe similar trends. However,
for q = 9 in DETOX, a fraction of ε̂ = 0.6 majorities is
distorted and even though this attack is considered weak,
the method breaks (constant 10% accuracy).
Similarly, ByzShield significantly outperforms Bulyan and
Multi-Krum-based schemes on ALIE (Figures 3, 4); Bulyan
cannot be paired with DETOX for q ≥ 1 for our setup since
the requirement f ≥ 4c(q)max +3, as discussed in Section 6.1,
cannot be satisfied. The maximum allowed q for DETOX
with Multi-Krum (Figures 4 and 8) is q = 5.
In signSGD, only the sign information of the gradient is re-
tained and sent to the PS by the workers. The PS will output
the majority of the signs for each dimension. The method’s
authors (Bernstein et al., 2019) suggest that gradient noise
distributions are in principle unimodal and symmetric due to
the Central Limit Theorem. Following the advice of (Rajput
et al., 2019), we pair this defense with the stronger constant
attack as sign flips (e.g., reversed gradient) are unlikely to af-
fect the gradient’s distribution. ByzShield with median still
enjoys an accuracy improvement of about 20% for q = 3
and a smaller one for q = 5. The results are in Figure 5.
All schemes defend well under the reversed gradient attack
for small values of q (Figures 6, 7, 8). Nevertheless, in
Figure 7, by testing ByzShield on large number of Byzantine
workers (q = 9) for which a fraction of ε̂ = 0.36 files are
distorted, we realize that it still converges to a relatively
high accuracy; Bulyan cannot be applied in this case. Multi-
Krum has an advantage over our method for this attack for
q = 9 (Figure 8). DETOX cannot be paired with Multi-
Krum in this case as it needs at least 2c(q)max + 3 = 7 groups.
Note that in our adversarial scenario, DETOX may perform
worse than its baseline counterpart depending on the fraction
of corrupted gradients. For example, in Figure 6, for q = 3,
ε̂DETOX = 0.2 while ε̂Median = 3/25 = 0.12 and this
reflects on better accuracy values for the baseline median.
In summary, there are two takeaways from these results
• The distortion fraction ε̂ is a good predictor of an ag-
gregation scheme’s convergence.
• ByzShield supersedes prior schemes by an average of
20% in terms of top-1 accuracy for large values of q
under various powerful attacks.
Training Time: In ByzShield, within an iteration, a worker
performs l forward/backward propagations (one for each
file) and transmits l gradients back to the PS. The rest of the
approaches would have each worker return a single gradient.
Hence, ByzShield spends more time on communication ow-
ing to the l transmissions. In both DETOX and ByzShield a
worker processes r times more samples compared to a base-
line technique. Thus, we expect redundancy based methods
to consume more time on computation at the worker level
than their baseline counterparts. Aggregation time varies a
lot by the method and the number of files to be processed by
the PS for the model update. As an example, baseline me-
dian, ByzShield and DETOX median-of-means took 3.14,
10.81 and 4 hours, respectively, for the full training under
the ALIE attack with q = 3 (Figure 2). The corresponding
per-iteration time estimate (average across iterations) is in
Figure 12 of the Appendix.
We emphasize though that the central finding of our work
is that careful assignment of tasks to workers can signifi-
cantly improve the overall robustness of the training and our
focus was not on optimizing the implementation. There is
ample scope for improving the implementation to reduce
the overall time consumption. This can be done, e.g., by
using GPUs or workers with higher network bandwidth.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We chose to utilize median for our method as it was per-
forming well in all of our experiments. However, ByzShield
can also be used with non-trivial aggregation schemes such
as Bulyan and Multi-Krum and potentially yield even better
results. Our scheme is significantly more robust than the
most sophisticated defenses in literature at the expense of in-
creased computation and communication time. We believe
that implementation-related improvements such as adding
support for GPUs can alleviate the computation overhead.
Algorithmic improvements to make it more communication-
efficient are also interesting directions for future work.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Asymptotic Complexity
If the gradient computation has linear complexity and since
each worker is assigned to l files of b/f samples each, the
gradient computation cost at the worker level is O((lb/f)d)
(K such computations in parallel). In our schemes, however,
b is a constant multiple of f and l ≤ r; hence, the complex-
ity becomes O(rd) which is identical to other redundancy-
based schemes in (Rajput et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018).
The complexity of aggregation varies significantly depend-
ing on the operator. For example, majority voting can
be done in time which scales linearly with the number of
votes using MJRTY proposed in (Boyer & Moore, 1991).
In our case, this is O(Kd) as the PS needs to use the d-
dimensional input from all K machines. Krum (Blanchard
et al., 2017), Multi-Krum (Damaskinos et al., 2019) and
Bulyan (El Mhamdi et al., 2018) are applied to all K work-
ers by default and require O(K2(d+ logK)).
A.2 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. As all nodes in S have degree l, the number of out-
going edges from S is l|S|. For a file to be distorted it needs
at least r′ of its copies to be processed by Byzantine nodes.
Furthermore, we know that collectively the nodes process
at least β files. Using these observations, we have
l|S| ≥ c(q)maxr′ + (|N (S)| − c(q)max)
⇒ l|S| ≥ c(q)maxr′ + (β − c(q)max) (7)
⇒ l|S| ≥ c(q)max(r′ − 1) + β
⇒ l|S| − β ≥ c(q)max(r′ − 1)
⇒ c(q)max ≤
l|S| − β
r′ − 1
=
ql − β
(r − 1)/2
def
= γ
where in Eq. (7) we have substituted the result from Eq.
(5).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. From (Burnwal et al., 2019) [Theorem 6], the sin-
gular values of the zero-one (unnormalized) biadjacency
matrixH can be characterized in three distinct cases; we uti-
lize the first two of them. They are presented below with the
singular values reported in decreasing order of magnitude.
• Ramanujan Case 1: If 2 ≤ m < s, then H = BT
has singular values and corresponding multiplicities
{(
√
sm, 1), (
√
s,m(s− 1)), (0,m− 1)}.
• Ramanujan Case 2: If m ≥ s and s|m, then H = B
has singular values and corresponding multiplicities
{(
√
sm, 1), (
√
m, (s− 1)s), (0, s− 1)}.
In order to perform a direct comparison between the MOLS
and Ramanujan construction we want to examine the eigen-
values of the normalized biadjacency matrix A = 1√
dLdR
H
(from Section 3) multiplied by its transpose, i.e., we are in-
terested in the spectrum of (AAT )Ram.1 and (AAT )Ram.2.
In all cases, observe that dLdR = sm and the spectrum of
AAT = 1smHH
T in Lemma 2 of the main text is easily de-
duced; these eigenvalues will be the squares of the singular
values of H multiplied by 1sm .
We continue by computing the spectrum of (AAT )MOLS .
Suppose that the workers are partitioned into r parallel
classes depending on the LS used to populate them. The
classes for Latin squares L1, . . . , Lr will be denoted with
P1, . . . ,Pr, respectively. The underlying principle is that a
parallel class includes exactly one replica of each file. Let
X = l
(
1√
lr
)2
Il =
1
r
Il =

1/r 01/r
. . .
0 1/r

and
Y = 1
(
1√
lr
)2
Jl =
1
lr
Jl
where Jn is the all-ones n× n matrix.
Based on the placement scheme introduced in Section 4.1.2
the matrix (AAT )MOLS takes the following K ×K block
form.
(AAT )MOLS =

X Y Y · · · · · · Y
Y X Y Y · · · Y
Y Y X Y
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . Y
Y · · · · · · Y X Y
Y · · · · · · · · · Y X

Hence, the blocks of (AAT )MOLS take one of the forms
X,Y . This is shown by observing that blocks X concern
multiplication of rows of A with columns of AT which
correspond to workers within a parallel class (if the index
of the row of A is the same as the index of the column of
AT then l entries ( 1√
lr
)2 are added, otherwise there is no
common file and the product is zero). Similarly, blocks that
have the form of Y concern pairs of workers from different
parallel classes which share exactly one file.
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We observe that
(AAT )MOLS =
1
lr

0 1 · · · 1
1 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1
1 · · · 1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Cr×r
⊗Jl +
1
r
Ilr. (8)
The characteristic polynomial of Jl is (λ − l)λl−1 and its
spectrum (with corresponding algebraic multiplicities) is
σ(Jl) = {(l, 1), (0, l − 1)} (Horn & Johnson, 2012) which
coincides with the spectrum of the adjacency matrix of a
complete graph with self-edges.
Note 1. If λ is an eigenvalue of A with eigenvector x, then
λ+ c is an eigenvalue of A+ cI with the same eigenvector
x.
For C, note that σ(C) = {(r − 1, 1), (−1, r − 1)} since it
is a rank-1 update of Jr (cf. Note 1).
Let D := C ⊗ Jl and spectra σ(C) = {λ1, . . . , λr} and
σ(AAT ) = {µ1, . . . , µl} then
σ(D) = {λiµj , i = 1, . . . , r, j = 1, . . . , l}
= {(l(r − 1), 1), (−l, r − 1), (0, (l − 1)r)}.
Note 2. If λ is an eigenvalue of A with eigenvector x, then
αλ is an eigenvalue of αA with the same eigenvector x.
Using Note 2, the spectrum of the term 1lrD in Eq. (8)
becomes{(
1
lr l(r − 1), 1
)
,
(
1
lr (−l), r − 1
)
,
(
1
lr0, (l − 1)r
)}
=
{(
1(r−1)
lr , 1
)
, (−1/r, r − 1), (0, (l − 1)r)
}
which by Note 2 yields
σ((AAT )MOLS) =
{(1(r − 1)
lr
+ 1/r, 1
)
, · · ·
(−1/r + 1/r, r − 1), · · ·
(0 + 1/r, (l − 1)r)
}
= {(1, 1), (0, r − 1), (1/r, (l − 1)r)}.
A.4 Proof of Claim 2
Proof. We begin by proving the result for the MOLS-based
scheme. We note that there is a bijection between the files
and the grid’s cells (i, j) (cf. Section 4.1); we will refer
to the files using their cell’s coordinates and vice versa. A
worker Uk which belongs to Lα is such that its files are
completely characterized by the solutions to an equation of
the form αi+ j = z.
These facts immediately imply that workers belong to a
LS Lα do not have any files in common. As the equations
corresponding to Lα and Lβ for α 6= β are linearly inde-
pendent, we also have that any two workers from different
Latin squares share exactly one file.
The respective proofs for the two cases of the claim are
given below.
• Case 1: r = 3.
For q = 2 and based on the above observations, it is
evident that attacking q = 2 workers cannot distort
more than one file, their common file. This yields
c
(q)
max = 1 and ε̂ = 1/f .
For q = 3, we want to show that we can distort up to
c
(q)
max = 3 files. Suppose that the three Latin squares
in which the workers lie are denoted Lαi , i = 1, 2, 3
where the αi’s are distinct. We can choose any z1
and z2 such that the workers U1 and U2 specified by
α1i+ j = z1 and α2i+ j = z2 respectively. Suppose
that the common file in these workers is denoted by
(i1, j1). For U3 specified by α3i + j = z3 we only
need to ensure that we pick z3 6= α3i1 + j1. This can
always be done since there are l − 1 other choices for
z3.
With these we can see that any two workers within the
set {U1, U2, U3} share a file. As r = 3, this implies
that c(q)max = 3 for q = 3 and ε̂ = 3/f .
• Case 2: r > 3.
The argument we make for this case follows along the
same lines as that for q = 3 above. Note that to distort
a given file we have to pick r′ workers Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′
from distinct LS Lα1 , . . . , Lαr′ which correspond to a
system of equations of the form
α1i+ j = zk1
α2i+ j = zk2
...
αr′i+ j = zkr′ .
(9)
This system of equations has to have a common solu-
tion denoted by (i1, j1). We can pick at most r′ − 1
more workers Ukr′+1 , . . . , Ukr since q ≤ r. If these
workers have to distort a different file, then they need
to certainly have a common solution denoted (i2, j2)
along with one worker from {Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′}. Note
that we cannot pick two workers from {Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′}
since any two such workers already share (i1, j1).
Finally, we note that among these workers we cannot
find another subset of r′ workers that share a third
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file (i3, j3) since any such subset will necessarily in-
clude at least two files from either {Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′} or
{Ukr′+1 , . . . , Ukr}. This concludes the proof.
We continue by proving the claim for Ramanujan Case
1. The structure of the bi-adjacency matrix B in Section
4.2.1 will reveal useful properties used in this proof. Since
Ramanujan Case 2 uses BT instead of B, that proof is very
similar and will be omitted.
Let us start by substituting the parameters for Case 1 which
are m = r and s = l so that B becomes an l × r block
matrix with dimensions l2 × rl (tall matrix)
B =

Il Il Il · · · Il
Il P P
2 · · · P r−1
Il P
2 P 4 · · · P 2(r−1)
Il P
3 P 6 · · · P 3(r−1)
...
...
...
...
...
Il P
l−1 P 2(l−1) · · · P (r−1)(l−1)

. (10)
As in the case of MOLS, suppose that the workers are par-
titioned into r parallel classes P1, . . . ,Pr depending on
which block-column of B was used to populate them. In
this case, the ith block-column of B is mapped to the ith
parallel class of workers, Pi.
Also, define a bijection φ between the indices 0, . . . , l2 − 1
of the files (rows of B) and tuples of the form (x, y) where
x, y ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1} such that the mapping for a file index
i is
φ : i→ (x, y) = (bi/lc, i (mod l)).
In the remaining part, we will be referring to the files as
tuples (x, y).
Our next objective is to describe each worker Uk with a
linear equation which encodes the relationship between x
and y of the files (x, y) assigned to Uk.
Due to its special structure, let us focus on the first block
column which corresponds to P1. Note that the files stored
by each of the first l workers U0, . . . , Ul−1 respectively
satisfy the following equations
y = 0 (mod l)
y = 1 (mod l)
...
y = l − 1 (mod l).
(11)
We want to derive the equations for the remaining parallel
classes P2, . . . ,Pr. For a class Pi ∈ {P2, . . . ,Pr} and
letting Uk1 , . . . , Ukl−1 be the workers of Pi, their files re-
spectively satisfy
(i− 1)x− y = 0 (mod l)
(i− 1)x− y = 1 (mod l)
...
(i− 1)x− y = l − 1 (mod l).
(12)
for all values of i ∈ {2, . . . , r}. Simple observations of the
structure of powers of the permutation matrix P of Step 2
in Section 4.2.1 and that of matrix B in Eq. (10) should
convince the reader of the above fact.
Let us proceed to the optimal distortion analysis. The en-
suing discussion is almost identical to that for MOLS pre-
sented earlier in the current section (refer to that for more
details).
• Case 1: r = 3.
For q = 2, it is straightforward to see that any pair of
linearly independent equations (from two adversarial
workers of different classes) yields their unique com-
mon file (x, y) which is distorted; hence c(q)max = 1 and
ε̂ = 1/f .
For q = 3, we can either pick one equation (worker)
from Eq. (11) and the remaining two from Eq. (12) or
pick all three from Eq. (12). In any case, an appropriate
choice of the three equations can guarantee that any
subset of two of them are linearly independent so that
c
(q)
max = 3 gradients are distorted and ε̂ = 3/f .
• Case 2: r > 3.
Pick the first r′ adversaries Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′ from distinct
classes (the choice of classes is irrelevant). Jointly
solving any two of them fully describes a gradient
(x, y) and substituting that solution to the remaining
equations will guide us to the choice of the remaining
Byzantines needed to distort the file (x, y).
Then, for the other r′−1 Byzantines we make sure that
at least one of them, say Uk, does not belong to any of
the classes which include Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′ and that Uk
does not store (x, y); this implies that by solving the
system of the equations of Uk and any other Byzan-
tine chosen so far we compute a file (x′, y′). To skew
(x′, y′) we need r′−2 new adversariesUkr′+1 , . . . , Ukr
which store it. It is clear that (x′, y′) has to be a solu-
tion to their equations (none of these adversaries can
be in {Uk1 , . . . , Ukr′}). Then, c
(q)
max = 2 and ε̂ = 2/f .
A.5 Extra Simulation Results on c(q)max and ε̂
More simulations similar to those of Section 5.3 of the main
paper are shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Note that we evaluate
ByzShield: An Efficient and Robust System for Distributed Training
Table 4: Distortion fraction evaluation for
Ramanujan-based assignment (Case 2) for (m, s) = (5, 5),
i.e., (K, f, l, r) = (25, 25, 5, 5) and comparison.
q c
(q)
max ε̂
ByzShield ε̂Baseline ε̂FRC γ
3 1 0.04 0.12 0.2 2.43
4 1 0.04 0.16 0.2 3.9
5 2 0.08 0.2 0.2 5.56
6 4 0.16 0.24 0.4 7.35
7 5 0.2 0.28 0.4 9.25
8 7 0.28 0.32 0.4 11.23
9 9 0.36 0.36 0.6 13.28
10 12 0.48 0.4 0.6 15.38
11 14 0.56 0.44 0.6 17.54
12 17 0.68 0.48 0.8 19.73
only up to q = 13 in Table 5 since the problem quickly
becomes computationally intractable and takes too long to
finish as the number of combinations scales exponentially.
A.6 Deep Learning Experiments Hyperparameters
The images have been normalized using standard values
of mean and standard deviation for the dataset. We chose
b = 750 for both cases (K = 25 and K = 15). The
value used for momentum was set to 0.9 and we trained
for 13 epochs in all experiments. In the following tables,
a learning rate scheduling is denoted with (x, y, z); this
notation signifies the fact that we start with a rate equal
to x and every z iterations we multiply the rate by y. We
will also index the schemes in order of appearance in the
corresponding figure’s legend. Experiments of ByzShield
which appear in multiple figures are not repeated here (we
ran those training processes once). In order to pick the
optimal hyperparameters for each scheme, we performed
an extensive grid search involving different combinations
of (x, y, z). For each method, we ran 200 iterations for
each such combination and chose the one which was giving
the lowest value of average cross-entropy loss (principal
criterion) and the highest value of top-1 accuracy (secondary
criterion).
Table 5: Distortion fraction evaluation for MOLS-based
assignment for (K, f, l, r) = (35, 49, 7, 5) and comparison.
q c
(q)
max ε̂
ByzShield ε̂Baseline ε̂FRC γ
3 1 0.02 0.12 0.14 2.68
4 1 0.02 0.16 0.14 4.39
5 2 0.04 0.2 0.14 6.36
6 4 0.08 0.24 0.29 8.54
7 5 0.1 0.28 0.29 10.89
8 8 0.16 0.32 0.29 13.37
9 10 0.2 0.36 0.43 15.97
10 11 0.22 0.4 0.43 18.67
11 14 0.29 0.44 0.43 21.44
12 16 0.33 0.48 0.57 24.29
13 20 0.41 0.52 0.57 27.2
Table 6: Distortion fraction evaluation for MOLS-based
assignment for (K, f, l, r) = (21, 49, 7, 3) and comparison.
q c
(q)
max ε̂
ByzShield ε̂Baseline ε̂FRC γ
2 1 0.02 0.1 0.14 2.23
3 3 0.06 0.14 0.14 4.67
4 5 0.1 0.19 0.29 7.72
5 8 0.16 0.24 0.29 11.29
6 12 0.24 0.29 0.43 15.27
7 16 0.33 0.33 0.43 19.6
8 21 0.43 0.38 0.57 24.22
9 25 0.51 0.43 0.57 29.08
10 29 0.59 0.52 0.71 34.15
ByzShield: An Efficient and Robust System for Distributed Training
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Iterations
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
T
op
-1
 te
st
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
(%
)
Median, q = 2
ByzShield, q = 2
DETOX-MoM, q = 2
Figure 9: ALIE attack and
median-based defenses (CIFAR-10),
K = 15.
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Figure 10: ALIE attack and
Bulyan-based defenses (CIFAR-10),
K = 15
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Figure 11: ALIE attack and
Multi-Krum-based defenses
(CIFAR-10), K = 15.
Table 7: Parameters used for training.
Figure Schemes Learning rateschedule
2 1, 2 (0.00625, 0.96, 15)
2 3 (0.025, 0.96, 15)
2 4, 5, 6 (0.01, 0.95, 20)
3 1, 2 (0.003125, 0.96, 15)
4 1 (0.00625, 0.96, 15)
4 2, 5, 6 (0.01, 0.95, 20)
5 1, 2 (0.0001, 0.99, 20)
5 3, 4 (0.025, 0.96, 15)
5 5, 6 (0.001, 0.5, 50)
6 1, 2, 4 (0.05, 0.96, 15)
6 3 (0.1, 0.95, 50)
6 5, 6 (0.025, 0.96, 15)
7 1, 2 (0.025, 0.96, 15)
7 4 (0.05, 0.96, 15)
8 1, 2, 3 (0.05, 0.96, 15)
8 7, 8 (0.025, 0.96, 15)
9 1 (0.003125, 0.96, 15)
9 2 (0.01, 0.96, 15)
9 3 (0.0125, 0.96, 15)
10 1 (0.0015625, 0.96, 15)
11 1 (0.003125, 0.96, 15)
11 3 (0.0125, 0.96, 15)
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Figure 12: Per-iteration time estimate (ALIE attack and
median-based defenses (CIFAR-10)).
